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Abstract—In recent years, cyber-physical system (CPS) se-
curity as applied to robotic systems has become a popular
research area. Mainly because robotics systems have traditionally
emphasized the completion of a specific objective and lack
security oriented design. Our previous work, HoneyBot [16],
presented the concept and prototype of the first software hybrid
interaction honeypot specifically designed for networked robotic
systems. The intuition behind HoneyBot was that it would be a
remotely accessible robotic system that could simulate unsafe
actions and physically perform safe actions to fool attackers.
Unassuming attackers would think they were connected to an
ordinary robotic system, believing their exploits were being
successfully executed. All the while, the HoneyBot is logging
all communications and exploits sent to be used for attacker
attribution and threat model creation. In this paper, we present
findings from the result of a user study performed to evaluate
the effectiveness of the HoneyBot framework and architecture as
it applies to real robotic systems. The user study consisted of
40 participants, was conducted over the course of several weeks,
and drew from a wide range of participants aged between 18-
60 with varying level of technical expertise. From the study we
found that research subjects could not tell the difference between
the simulated sensor values and the real sensor values coming
from the HoneyBot, meaning the HoneyBot convincingly spoofed
communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Often robotic systems come in different shapes, sizes, and
colors. At the end of the day the thing they all have in
common is that they are built for a purpose. Whether it be
for performing telesurgery [25], automating smart factories
[22], or assisting infantry soldiers [24], robots are built for
accomplishing specific objectives. In the past and even at the
present, when designing robots to achieve these objectives,
roboticists often exclude security principles and techniques.
These exclusions are usually the manifestation of having never
been formally trained on secure practices or the result of
some implicit hardware/software constraints of their system.
These security shortcomings in robotic system have led to
our two main research questions: when put in a situation to
take advantage of a robotic system, will users do so and of
those users who will, can they detect the difference between
manipulating the real system and a simulated one?
A. HoneyBot for Robotic Systems
With robotic systems becoming more and more integrated
into the fabric of everyday life, it is paramount to secure them
before they become safety hazards to society. In our previous
work [16], we proposed HoneyBot, the first software hybrid in-
teraction honeypot specifically designed for networked robotic
systems.
HoneyBot is a hybrid interaction honeypot that alternates
between simulation and physical actuation. It takes into ac-
count device physics and uses device modeling to provide
realistic simulations for requested commands when they are
deemed too hazardous, for either the robot or the environment,
to be performed. If the requested command is deemed benign
or otherwise safe, it is physically performed by the robotic
system. In both cases, whether a command is deemed safe
or unsafe the system response is sent back to the attacker as
depicted in Figure 1.
Fig. 1: HoneyBot system architecture.
B. HoneyBot User Evaluation
To evaluate the HoneyBot, we obtained IRB approval
from the Georgia Institute of Technology and employed a
longitudinal study over the course of several weeks with 40
recruited participants. The users connected to the HoneyBot
via a web GUI and were given access to remotely navigate the
robot through a maze, shown in Figure 2. Participants were told
that their goal was to control a robot through an assessment
course for testing the navigational capabilities of the remotely
accessible robot under various constraints for determining the
optimal constraint profile for the performance and efficiency
of the robot. They were informed that their actions on the web
GUI would cause a robot to physically move through a real
maze and instructed to use the arrow keys on their keyboard
in the online virtual interface to navigate the GUI robot as
quickly as possible through the online maze to the finish flags.
Participants were also instructed to use the sensor values on the
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online control panel (located to the right of the online virtual
maze) to maintain situational awareness of the robot. In order
to add a sense of urgency to the users there was a 60 second
time constraint placed on the navigation task, but participants
were allowed a 75 second preview of the maze to plan their
route. This time limit was enforced to make the situation more
akin to how a real attacker would act after gaining access
to a computer system. Usually, they aim to perform their
malicious payload as quickly as possible then exit the system.
The 75 second preview can be thought of as an abbreviated
reconnaissance phase before the actual cyber attack. This is the
time when an attacker would analyze the network or system to
determine its weakest points and/or make a plan for carrying
out the payload. This preview/reconnaissance phase is what
allows the actual task completion to be so short, once the
plan is made carrying it out is simple. After completing the
experiment, participants completed a short survey about their
experiences. The survey was crafted in such a way to determine
what navigational routes participants took through the maze,
why they chose the routes they did, whether or not they
completed the maze in the given time, and what, if anything,
did they notice about the robot’s sensor control panel.
Fig. 2: Online HoneyMaze with danger signs throughout.
What the participants of the research study didn’t know was
that in reality they were only controlling the robot through the
real maze part of the time. On the online maze there were
four paths marked with danger signs, and all users were given
the same instructions regarding the viable paths to take. They
were simply told, ”consider all possible routes”. These danger
signs indicated no real danger to the robot, but were instead
symbolic of a ”restricted zone” on a real computer system.
Given that the HoneyBot is a honeypot for robotic systems,
the danger signs served as this honey, or temptation to go
outside of the ”safe zone”. The danger signs marked shortcuts
through the maze, and if the participants attempted to go near
them the robot would bust through the sign emerging on the
other side. The online maze was setup in such a way that the
only way to complete the maze in the time given was to ”take
the honey” and cut through at least one danger sign.
We have implemented our proof of concept HoneyBot
in a hardware prototype programmable ground robot. Our
user study shows that the majority of users cannot detect
the difference between actually controlling the HoneyBot and
the HoneyBot simulating control of the system sending back
”spoofed” system responses. We found that on average 35%
of users will deviate or make riskier choices in the presence
of pressure to experience higher reward. In summary, the main
contribution of this work is the evaluation of the effectiveness
of a HoneyBot prototype via a user study. Our results show that
users are unable to determine the difference between physically
controlling the HoneyBot versus the HoneyBot simulating
control of the system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
2 we present related work in the area of honeypots, Section
3 describes the proof of concept HoneyBot design and imple-
mentation in detail, Section 4 details the HoneyBot experimen-
tal design, Section 5 discusses the experimental results of the
user study. Section 6 and 7 discuss our conclusions and future
work.
II. RELATED WORK
Until recently, honeypots have generally been tools used
only in IT networks to both detect attackers infiltrating the
network, and to monitor their behavior and learn their attack
strategies. The fidelity of these honeypots has ranged from low
interaction to high interaction, and their effectiveness has been
evaluated on the basis of how easily and accurately attack-
ers can detect that they are in a honeypot using automated
techniques. Low interaction honeypots are easily detected
while high interaction honeypots consisting essentially of real
systems are significantly harder to detect. However, these
techniques that are used to evaluate traditional honeypots fail
to measure the effectiveness of high-fidelity cyber physical
system (CPS) honeypots, where not only must the software be-
have like a real system, but the reported physics of the system
must also. Automatically determining the difference between a
high-fidelity physical simulation and the real physical process
is very difficult, so attackers must be able to subjectively make
the decision using their own human intuition. Therefore, novel
methods for evaluating the effectiveness of CPS honeypots that
take this factor into account are necessary.
The first CPS honeynet addressed supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) networks and was created by
Pothamsetty and Franz of the Cisco Infrastructure Assurance
Group (CIAG) in 2004 [20]. The researchers were able to
simulate popular PLC services with the goal to better un-
derstand the risks of exposed control system devices. This
work laid the foundation for many other CPS honeypots [21],
[26], including our own previous work creating a framework
for hybrid interaction CPS honeypots [17] and honeypots for
robotic systems [16]. However, the fidelity of these hybrid
interaction CPS honeypots were only evaluated by visually
comparing the simulations to real values, and not testing
whether a true adversary could tell the difference.
Security has always been an arms race between attackers
and defenders, and honeypot detection is no exception. Attack-
ers are constantly discovering new combinations of evidence
that fingerprint a honeypot’s identity and researchers are end-
lessly trying to modify them to blend in. For example, an early
high-interaction honeynet, Sebek [13], which was exposed the
very next year as a honeynet by techniques described in [9].
The next evolution of Sebek, called Qebek, attempted to hide
more effectively by using virtualized high-interaction systems
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[14]. For many non-high-interaction honeypots, evasion boils
down to finding the edges of emulation for the presented
services, but timing approaches have also been used [6]. For
example, Kippo is a popular medium-interaction honeypot for
the SSH (Secure Shell) service [7]. Kippo is easily detected
by sending a number of carriage returns, and noting the
output difference from production SSH servers [18]. While
high interaction honeypots are harder to detect, many rely on
virtualization. Virtualization technologies usually leave their
own fingerprints, such as device names, device driver names,
file-system hallmarks, and loaded kernel modules [12]. Even
though these fingerprints can be altered, there exist a rich set of
techniques for detecting virtualization (and defeating detection
attempts) from the malware-analysis field [4].
Other, more honeypot-technology agnostic, detection tech-
niques have been proposed. Some of these techniques rely
on the liability issues inherent in hosting deliberately com-
promised machines. A botnet architecture proposed in [27]
leverages the honeypot owner’s desire to restrict outgoing
malicious traffic to authenticate new hosts before integrating
them into the botnet. Specifically, the new host is directed to
send apparently malicious traffic to an already compromised
”sensor.” Most honeypot systems will attempt to identify and
block or modify this malicious traffic, so whether the sensor
receives the traffic unaltered can be used to determine if
the new host is genuine. This work was built upon in [11],
where multiple pieces of evidence can be formally combined
to derive a metric of likelihood that a host is a honeypot.
This evidence could be the virtualization status of the host,
the diversity of software on the host, the level of activity
of the host, or the difficulty in compromising the host. This
newer technique is presented in the context of a botnet, but
the generalized belief metric is equally applicable to any
honeypot technology, depending on the evidence used. There
are also techniques, described in two more recent surveys [3]
[19], which elaborate on the ideas above, including finding
edges of emulation, finding subtle discrepancies that indicate
virtualization, or analyzing the results of communication with
an already compromised sensor.
Since the physics of every CPS system is unique, it is
much more difficult for attackers to create automated tools
for detecting physical simulations. Therefore, the goal of a
CPS honeypot is to be realistic enough to fool a human
attacker’s intuition of the physics of the process, which most
closely resembles social engineering and phishing attacks. The
effectiveness of these kinds of attacks have been extensively
studied [8], [23], [5], but there are significant differences
between fooling a civilian with a phishing email and fooling
an attacker with a physical simulation. This work employs
real human subjects to test the fidelity of the CPS honeypot
physical simulation, which was not done in our previous work
[16]. The high-fidelity, hybrid interaction HoneyBot system
was deployed in a maze environment and human subjects were
asked to remotely navigate the robot through the maze and later
questioned on how real the challenge seemed.
III. PROOF OF CONCEPT HONEYBOT
In order to facilitate the most representative user evaluation
of the HoneyBot as possible, we constructed the HoneyBot
framework and architecture on a real robotic system. The
design details of this proof of concept HoneyBot and the
subsequent user experimentation are described in this section.
The GoPiGo 3 [15], shown in Figure 3a, was the chosen
robotic system for the proof of concept HoneyBot. This
platform was selected because of the ease of programming,
through its support of the Python programming language,
and the many I/O interfaces for attaching various robotic
sensors. In addition to this the GoPiGo 3 was selected over
the GoPiGo 2, used for initial model development, because
of its magnetic encoders which ensure accurate robot control
and its redesigned power management system which gives it
longer battery life. These upgrades were crucial to performing
the evaluation described in Section IV. The GoPiGo 3 Robot
Car is a ground robot that consists of six major components:
a GoPiGo 3 circuit board, a Raspberry Pi 3 [10], two motors,
two wheels, various sensors, and a battery pack. The GoPiGo
3 circuit board, shown in Figure 3b, can be considered the
secondary controller of the GoPiGo 3 Robot Car. It connects to
the header pins of the Raspberry Pi 3, shown in Figure 3c, and
receives motor control commands as well as provides status
updates about the various connected sensors. The Raspberry
Pi 3 is the main controller of the robot and can be accessed
via direct connection (through its HDMI port), SSH, or VNC.
The Raspberry Pi 3 runs the Raspbian OS, a version of Linux
created especially for single board computers.
(a)
(b) (c)
Fig. 3: Images of the (a) fully outfitted GoPiGo3 Robot Car
(b) GoPiGo3 Circuit Board (c) and Raspberry Pi 3.
A. HoneyBot Software
The HoneyBot software was written in Python 2.7 and is
made up of three main modules: the Robot Web Server, The
Robot Controller, and the HoneyBot Module.
1) Robot Web Server: The robot web server is essentially
the Internet Interface Module from the HoneyPhy framework
and serves to communicate and transport commands from the
front end (web page) to the robot’s actual hardware. The
server was written using the Tornado web framework [1].
The web server is the process that is called to spin up every
other module. When executed the web server instantiates a
robot object (the Robot Controller), a HoneyBot object (the
HoneyBot Module), serves up the HoneyBot login page, and
facilitates all web requests from clients through web sockets.
The HoneyBot login page was used to safeguard the robot
experimentation and evaluation process by defending access
to the robots hardware with a rotating pairs of usernames and
passwords. Before anyone could access the robot experiment
website they had to enter a correct username/password pair
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and each set of credentials could only be used once before
being invalidated, like a nonce.
2) Robot Controller: The robot controller can be consid-
ered the Process Model from the HoneyPhy framework [17] as
it receives commands from the robot web server and translates
them to navigational commands for the robot to perform or
simulate. For instance, if the user clicks the right arrow key
this is transported over a web socket from the client web page
to the Tornado web server backend. The backend makes a call
to the robot controller object which converts it to a navigation
command and passes that to the Input Verification Module
along with the robots’ current status. The Input Verification
Module then determines whether or not the command is safe to
perform and if it is it gets sent to the robot’s motors. If unsafe
the HoneyBot Module queries the sensor Device Models and
spoofed data is returned.
3) HoneyBot Module: The honeybot module is responsible
for running a background process that constantly queries the
robot for true sensor data. If the Input Verification Module
detects an unsafe command the robot controller will call the
honeybot modules’ simulateStatusUpdate method and each of
the robot’s sensor Device Models will be queried for simulated
data. The simulated data was collected through empirical
observation and is described in detail in Section IV-A.
B. HoneyBot Sensors
The HoneyBot had five sensors, shown in Figure 4: a Sen-
solute MVS0608.02 Collision Sensor, an iPhone 5 Compass,
a GrovePi SEN10737P Ultrasonic Sonar, a Dexter Industries
Laser Distance Sensor, and an Aosong DHT11 Temperature
Sensor. These sensors were chosen because of their signif-
icance to real-world ground robot applications. A collision
sensor can be crucial to the well being of navigational robots,
that are autonomous or remotely controlled, as they are the
first line of defense for detecting and preventing costly damage
to robotic end-effectors due to robot crashes [2]. A collision
sensor on a deployed autonomous robotic system can be used
to report damage to relevant parties who may be physically
distant. In order to know where to dispatch rescue teams,
monitoring parties need to know the robots’ location. This
is where the compass, laser distance, and ultrasonic sonar
sensors come in to play. While they don’t provide absolute
location, like a GPS would, in many indoor or well-defined
environments they are equally useful.
An iPhone 5 was used as the compass for the HoneyBot
because it provided more accurate headings than the STMicro-
electronics LSM303D 6-Axis Accelerometer & Compass. The
small magnetometer in the accelerometer could not overcome
the interference from the many electrical components on the
GoPiGo 3 and produced inaccurate data. The iPhone 5 has
much better internal component shielding and did not suffer
from interference when placed near the robot. An iOS mobile
application, called RoboCompass, was written in the Swift
programming language and downloaded to the phone. The
RoboCompass App sends compass readings in IP dataframes
to the HoneyBot web server every time the compass reading
changes (every time the robot moves).
IV. HONEYBOT EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Since the HoneyBot was built on a ground robot, the best
form of evaluation was determined to be a navigational task.
To support this, an evaluation arena was built in the form of a
10 x 12 foot maze (shown in Figure 5) and participants (with
no prior knowledge of the research) were recruited over the
course of one week to remotely navigate the HoneyBot through
it. Before beginning this study IRB approval was requested
from the Georgia Tech Office of Research Integrity Assurance
and the experiment protocol was designed.
The ”HoneyMaze” was constructed from approximately six
2 x 4 foot pegboards (used for the base or ground surface)
and several hundred 1/2 x 48 inch wooden round dowels. The
wooden dowels were cut, using circular saw equipment from
the Georgia Tech ECE Senior Design Lab, into 6 inch pegs.
These 6 inch pegs were then strategically ”nailed” into the
pegboard base, one peg per every 3 peg holes, in the design of
the pre-selected maze. After the pegs were secured in place
rolls of 48 inch x 25 ft reflective insulation were cut into
7 inch tall strips and hot glued to one side of the pegs to
create barrier walls. Reflective insulation was used as the wall
material because a positive correlation was identified between
the robot’s distance sensor accuracy and the reflectivity of the
surfaces measured against.
The experiment required individuals to read instructions
on how to navigate a robot through an online maze and then
access the robot through a web interface. The participants
were told the online robot corresponded to a real robot who
at their every arrow keystroke would actuate through a life
sized maze identical to the one on their screen. Subjects were
told that their mission was to navigate the robot through the
maze fast as possible using only the online GUI maze and
live sensor values from the robot displayed on screen. They
were informed that the research objective was to determine
the optimal constraint profile for the best performance and
efficiency of the remotely controlled robot. A screenshot of
the website is shown in Figure 6. At the bottom of the figure
is a timer, participants were given 75 seconds to preview the
maze and plan a route, then 60 seconds to actually navigate
the robot to the finish flags. The ”constraints” they were
told was that the robot moves very slow and they should
plan their routes wisely, making sure to consider all possible
options. The research subjects were otherwise given no specific
guidance concerning the danger signs and when asked about
them experiment proctors only responded with ”the meaning
of the danger sign is up for interpretation, consider all possible
options”. To assist with the participant recruitment process and
as an added incentive for subjects to strive to complete the
maze quickly, they were promised $5 for participating and
$10 if they completed the maze before their 60 seconds ran
out.
The real merit of the study, which is what the research
participants were not told, is that the danger signs mark
”shortcuts” through the online maze and the navigation task
cannot be completed in the 60 second time limit without
cutting through at least two of them. The danger signs can
be thought of as the honey or vulnerable resource on a real
system/network tempting attackers to compromise it. The real
maze contains walls where the danger signs are located and
if they decided to take the ”shortcut”, the real robot would
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(a) (b) (c)
(d)
(e)
Fig. 4: Images of the HoneyBot sensors (a) Collision sensor (b) iPhone 5 Compass (c) Ultrasonic sonar (d) Laser Distance sensor
(e) and a Temperature sensor.
stop actuating through the real maze and simulate all further
interactions. After cutting through a danger sign the online
GUI robot continues through the maze ”normally”, but all
data output to the sensor control panel from that point on
is spoofed. After completing the experiment participants are
given a survey, and asked about the choices they made and
what happened during the experiment.
A. HoneyBot Sensor Model Development
Empirical observations were used to build the Device
Models for the HoneyBot sensors. For the temperature sensor,
compass, laser distance sensor, and ultrasonic sonar the model
development process was as follows:
1) The HoneyBot was placed at a viable maze location.
2) A Python script for sensor data collection was exe-
cuted and given the robots’ coordinates in the phys-
ical maze. After that the program polls the robots’
sensors for data values.
3) The script then creates an index in a CSV file with
the given coordinates and adds the sensor values to
the index.
This process is repeated several times at each of the 60
viable maze locations. A ”viable maze location” is defined
as an allowable maze location for the robot to navigate to.
Once these models were built the collision sensor device model
was very simple. Since the robot was not allowed to perform
commands that could actually cause it to crash, the only time
the collision sensor needed to read ”True” was when the robot
”cut through” a danger sign. To do this the actual reading
Fig. 5: Physical HoneyMaze with danger signs throughout.
Fig. 6: HoneyBot user experiment website.
from the collision sensor (”False”) was always outputted to the
user, unless they ”cut through” a danger sign. At that point the
collision sensor outputted ”True” and the ultrasonic sonar/laser
distance sensor outputted 0 for consistency. This was to really
create the illusion that the robot hit an obstacle, but managed
to keep going.
V. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
The purpose of this experiment was to evaluate the Honey-
Bot and determine how convincing the Sensor Device Models
developed from real observations were. Of particular interest in
the study were participants who ”cut through” danger signs to
complete the maze quicker, because that action automatically
triggered the Input Verification Module of the Robot Controller,
which stopped the real robot from actuating and initiated the
simulation.
A. Research Subject Demographics and Statistics
The research experiments took place on the Georgia Tech
Atlanta Campus over the course of one week and was
performed by 40 individuals from various academic/cultural
backgrounds, physical locations across the US, and stages of
life. The vast majority of subjects (95%) were young adults
between the ages of 18 and 26. Figures 7, 8, and 9 give
some quick statistics about the research subjects, including
their regional location and cultural background.
B. HoneyBot Experiment Findings
The HoneyBot experiment took approximately 20 min-
utes per participant and consisted of an initial instruction
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Fig. 7: HoneyBot user experiment research participant statis-
tics.
Fig. 8: HoneyBot user experiment research participant loca-
tions by US region.
overview, the actual experiment completion, and a concluding
survey. The Robot Experiment Survey was distributed through
Qualtrics Online Survey Software, and consisted of, at most
12 questions. Certain questions were displayed/omitted based
on participant responses. For example, if Question 4, ’was
the overall experiment completion process difficult?’, was
answered ’No’ then Question 5, ’what made it difficult?’, was
not asked. Five questions on the other hand, were always asked.
They served to provide baseline knowledge about the subjects’
experience. The questions were:
1) Were you able to navigate from start to finish of the
maze within the time limit? (Y/N)
2) Map your navigated route by selecting the letters on
the graphic below. If you did not finish the maze
select to the nearest point you reached. (A-Z)
3) On a scale of 1-5, where 1 is very inaccurate and 5
is very accurate, how accurate did the sensor values
displayed on the control panel seem throughout the
experiment? (1-5)
4) Was the overall experiment completion process diffi-
cult? (Y/N)
5) Did you at any point cross through a danger sign?
(Y/N)
Figure 10 shows the user responses to survey questions 1,
4, and 6. It can be gathered from the pie charts that the overall
experiment completion process was not difficult, most people
did not finish the maze in the allotted time, and a little over a
third of the participants (14 people) ”cut through” at least one
Fig. 9: HoneyBot user experiment research participant ethnic-
ity breakdown.
danger sign and were shown simulated sensor values.
Question 2 came with the labeled maze, and according to
the survey results, two of the three most traveled paths ”cut
through” danger signs. 79% of subjects took the top three most
navigated paths and the only other consistently navigated path
(taken by 3 participants) also ”cut through” a danger sign. It is
important to note that the routes depicted in Figure 11 indicate
”attempted” navigated routes, most subjects did not complete
the maze, but indicated that was the route they intended to
take.
In total, 14 participants cut through danger signs and
triggered the HoneyBot ’simulation mode’. Table I shows that
of all 40 participants surveyed, 70% of them rated the sensor
accuracy during the whole experiment a 3 or 4 (mean of 3.58)
out of 5. And of the 14 participants who cut through a danger
sign and unknowingly experienced simulated sensor values,
71% rated the sensor accuracy a 4 or 5 (mean of 3.86) out of
5. This can be interpreted to mean research subjects did not
notice a difference between the simulated sensor values and
the real sensor values coming from the HoneyBot. From this
it can be concluded that the HoneyBot developed successfully
fools ”deviant users” and the Sensor Device Models effectively
mirror reality.
VI. CONCLUSION
The need for security in the field of robotics is growing
and will continue growing as robots become ubiquitously
integrated into everyday life. Networked systems will always
be vulnerable and susceptible to exploits, but safeguards should
be put in place to ensure:
• Robotic systems able to distinguish between safe and
unsafe actions they are commanded to perform
• The system uses this distinction to protect itself from
physical harm
• There are reliable mechanisms means for system ad-
ministrators to learn of compromise
• There are methods for monitoring system intruders
As a proposed solution to these problems our previ-
ous work introduced the HoneyBot [16], the first honeypot
specifically designed for robotic systems. The HoneyBot uses
techniques from traditional honeypots and Device Models built
for common robotic sensors to simulate unsafe actions and
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Fig. 10: Survey responses to Question 4, Question 6, and Question 1.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 11: Top three most navigated routes by participants (a)
56% of subjects took this route (b) 22% of subjects took this
route (c) and 1% of participants took this route.
physically perform safe actions to fool attackers. Unassuming
attackers are led to believe they are connected to an ordinary
robotic system, believing their exploits are being successfully
executed. All the while the HoneyBot is logging all communi-
cations and exploits sent to be used for attacker attribution and
threat model creation. In this paper, we presented the results
of a user experiment performed to show the feasibility of the
HoneyBot framework and architecture as it applies to real
robotic systems and found that on average research subjects
could not differentiate between simulated sensor values and
the real sensor values coming from the HoneyBot. From this,
we conclude that the HoneyBot developed successfully fools
”deviant users” and the Sensor Device Models effectively
mirror reality.
VII. FUTURE WORK
The overarching goal of this research was to evaluate
the effectiveness a robotic system that could reasonably con-
vince remote connected attackers with malintent that their
malicious payloads are successful, while in reality simulating
data responses and preserving the real system. This was done
through a user study with the HoneyBot built on the GoPiGo
3 platform. While the preliminary results of the research study
are promising, there is more work that can be done to improve
the robustness of the ideas and implementations presented.
A. Evaluation Caveats
The robot experiment evaluation, though it proved the
HoneyBot was convincing should be taken with a grain of salt.
The small sample size of 40, is not enough to draw far-reaching
conclusions. More user testing needs to be done to solidify
the preliminary conclusions drawn. In addition to this, while
there were some safeguarding (research proctors monitored
the experiment task) against user falsifying the self reported
survey results, there is always the possibility of fabrication
when human subjects are involved and this must be considered.
B. Rethinking HoneyBot Remote Access Mechanisms and
Evaluation Redesign
One possible future direction for this work is a change
in HoneyBot remote access techniques and new methods for
evaluation. For the user study the HoneyBot was accessible
through a website which was functional, but had few usability
issues. Another more reliable mechanism for system accesses
which would aid in evaluation could be via a command line
tool such as SSH or even a graphical VNC. Otherwise, if a
website is the medium of choice, to reduce lag and support
a multi-user evaluation it is necessary to run the web server
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TABLE I: Survey results to questions about robot sensor accuracy
Scale
(1 is very inaccurate and 5 is very accurate)
How accurate did the sensor values
displayed on the control panel seem
throughout the experiment?
How accurate did the sensor values
displayed on the control panel seem
after you crossed through danger sign(s)?
1 1 (2.5%) 1 (7.14%)
2 4 (10%) 0 (0%)
3 13 (32.5%) 3 (21.43%)
4 15 (37.5%) 6 (42.86%)
5 7 (17.5%) 4 (28.57%)
Total 40 (100%) 14 (100%)
securely off-site. And the server should have enough resources
to handle many web requests simultaneously.
Future evaluations of the HoneyBot should not only involve
human user testing, but general performance metrics as well.
It would be important to note differences in response times of
real vs simulated responses sent over the network, as well as
any detectable footprint the HoneyBot software would leave on
the system. In order to remain undetectable, processes should
be hidden or run in an obfuscated manner very similar to a
root-kit. Attackers/malicious parties who somehow gain full
access to the system should not in theory be able to notice
a difference between identical systems if one is running the
HoneyBot software and the other is not.
In an effort to welcome contributions and continuations of
this research we have published source code for the HoneyBot
on GitHub as well as documents used for the user study.
The HoneyBot iPhone Compass App source code can be
found on GitHub at RoboCompass Code. The instructions
given to study participants before the experiment can be found
on GitHub at User Experiment Instructions. Finally, the full
survey participants completed after the experiment can be
found on GitHub at Qualtrics Survey.
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